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Introduction	  	  
Aid	  effectiveness	  is	  without	  a	  doubt	  the	  most	  central	  element	  in	  the	  ongoing	  discussion	  on	  
development	  cooperation.	  Although	  this	  discussion	  will	  certainly	  continue	  for	  a	  long	  time,	  it	  is	  
interesting	  to	  see	  that	  the	  search	  for	  ‘impediments	  to	  aid	  effectiveness’	  has	  been	  broadened	  
substantially	  when	  in	  the	  2000s	  donors	  finally	  and	  openly	  admitted	  that	  they	  also	  played	  a	  
role	  in	  making	  aid	  ineffective.	  As	  such,	  the	  Paris	  Declaration	  of	  2005	  (and	  the	  subsequent	  
declarations	  of	  Accra	  of	  2008	  and	  Busan	  in	  2011	  –	  see:	  OECD	  2005;	  OECD	  2008;	  OECD	  2011)	  
are	  as	  much	  a	  search	  for	  more	  effective	  aid	  as	  a	  way	  of	  saying	  that	  aid	  effectiveness	  (of	  better	  
the	  lack	  thereof)	  is	  due	  to	  elements	  on	  both	  the	  donor	  and	  recipients	  side.	  	  
	  
One	  of	  the	  main	  problems	  in	  reaching	  effective	  aid	  concerns	  the	  idea	  of	  donor	  proliferation	  
(little	  aid	  from	  many	  donors	  to	  many	  countries)	  and	  sector	  fragmentation	  (little	  aid	  spread	  
over	  many	  projects,	  programmes	  or	  sectors)	  (Schulpen	  et	  al.	  2011).	  Both	  proliferation	  and	  
fragmentation	  are	  then	  seen	  leading	  to	  high	  transaction	  costs	  and	  in	  effect	  to	  ineffective	  aid.	  
The	  ‘Paris	  sequence’	  is	  then	  largely	  based	  on	  finding	  solutions	  to	  the	  problems	  associated	  with	  
an	  increasing	  number	  of	  actors	  providing	  piecemeal	  assistance	  to	  a	  large	  number	  of	  recipients.	  
These	  declarations	  and	  the	  underlying	  principles	  call	  for	  a	  division	  of	  labour	  between	  
development	  actors.	  Although	  all	  of	  this	  sounds	  quite	  logical,	  there	  are	  at	  least	  three	  
problems	  with	  this	  discussion	  (Habraken,	  et	  al	  2014):	  (1)	  the	  largest	  part	  of	  the	  studies	  are	  
restricted	  to	  determining	  cross-­‐country	  allocation	  patterns	  (generally	  by	  making	  a	  distinction	  
between	  needs	  (e.g.,	  poverty	  levels),	  merits	  (e.g.,	  democracy)	  and	  self-­‐interest	  (e.g.,	  trade)	  
drivers	  (Hoeffler	  &	  Outram	  2008)	  but	  pay	  scant	  (if	  any)	  attention	  to	  in-­‐country	  patterns;	  (2)	  it	  
is	  largely	  restricted	  to	  the	  usual	  suspects	  of	  bilateral	  and	  multilateral	  agencies	  thus	  leaving	  out	  
many	  new	  development	  actors	  (such	  as	  the	  NGOs)	  and	  (3)	  Southern	  players	  (i.e.,	  Local	  NGOs)	  
are	  not	  part	  of	  this	  effectiveness/proliferation/fragmentation	  debate.	  	  
	  
There	  are	  few	  studies	  which	  have	  tried	  to	  mitigate	  the	  aforementioned	  issues	  by	  looking	  into	  
in-­‐country	  allocations	  of	  (Southern	  or	  Local)	  NGOs.	  Notable	  exceptions	  are	  the	  study	  by	  Brass	  
(2012)	  looking	  into	  geographical	  allocation	  patterns	  of	  local	  NGOs	  in	  Kenya	  and	  the	  one	  by	  
Habraken	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  also	  focusing	  on	  Kenya	  and	  essentially	  revisiting	  Brass’	  study	  but	  
including	  international	  NGOs	  in	  the	  equation.	  Both	  studies	  are	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  
are	  three	  possible	  explanations	  for	  in-­‐country	  allocations	  of	  LNGOs.	  ‘The	  first	  (“saintly”)	  states	  
that	  NGOs	  “locate	  their	  projects	  where	  recipient	  need	  is	  very	  great”,	  the	  second	  (“self-­‐
serving”)	  that	  they	  work	  where	  the	  NGO	  (or	  NGO	  workers)	  have	  “convenient	  access	  to	  goods	  
and	  services”,	  and	  the	  third	  (“political”)	  that	  they	  go	  where	  “powerful	  politicians	  help	  through	  
their	  patronage	  networks”’(Habraken	  et	  al.	  2014:2).	  	  
	  
Both	  studies	  showed	  that	  saintly	  and	  self-­‐serving	  reasons	  prevail,	  while	  ‘political	  pressures	  do	  
not	  appear	  to	  influence	  NGO	  locations	  in	  Kenya’	  (Brass	  2012:	  393).	  Habraken	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  add	  
that	  LNGOs	  and	  INGOs	  tend	  to	  follow	  each	  other,	  leading	  to	  herding	  behaviour	  (also	  see	  Koch	  
2009;	  Fruttero	  &	  Gauri	  2005).	  A	  possible	  explanation	  might	  be	  that	  LNGOs	  follow	  INGOs	  as	  the	  
latter	  is	  considered	  a	  large	  source	  of	  funding.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  one	  could	  also	  argue	  that	  
INGOs	  follow	  LNGOs	  as	  they	  seek	  local	  partner	  organisations	  to	  carry	  out	  their	  programme	  
implementation	  (Habraken	  et	  al.	  2014:	  9).	  	  
	  
What	  holds	  for	  Kenya	  naturally	  does	  not	  have	  to	  hold	  for	  another	  country	  as	  NGO	  sectors	  and	  
political,	  economic	  and	  social	  circumstances	  differ.	  Here,	  we	  set	  out	  to	  revisit	  the	  study	  of	  
	  	   2	  
Brass	  and	  Habraken	  et	  al.	  by	  looking	  into	  the	  allocation	  patterns	  of	  local	  NGOs	  in	  Yemen.	  
What	  then	  are	  the	  driving	  forces	  of	  the	  geographical	  allocation	  patterns	  of	  Yemeni	  NGOs?	  Put	  
differently:	  why	  do	  local	  NGOs	  in	  Yemen	  go	  where	  they	  go?	  We	  follow	  the	  same	  logic	  and	  
structure	  of	  both	  Kenya	  studies	  using	  data	  on	  NGO	  placement	  in	  Yemen	  for	  2013	  and	  data	  
from	  2008	  for	  our	  independent	  variables	  (or	  the	  latest	  data	  available	  –	  see	  further	  under	  
‘methodology’).	  We	  include	  international	  NGOs	  (INGOs)	  as	  an	  additional	  explanatory	  factor	  as	  
was	  done	  in	  Habraken	  et	  al.	  (2014).	  In	  doing	  so,	  we	  add	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  NGO	  
allocations,	  recognise	  NGOs	  as	  important	  players	  in	  the	  field	  of	  development	  (cooperation)	  
and	  contribute	  to	  a	  refined	  insight	  into	  the	  ongoing	  fragmentation	  and	  proliferation	  
discussion.	  
	  
This	  paper	  begins	  with	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  Yemeni	  context	  focusing	  particularly	  on	  political	  
change	  and	  the	  political/administrative	  structure	  of	  the	  country.	  This	  is	  followed	  by	  an	  
overview	  of	  LNGOs	  (and	  partly	  INGOs)	  active	  in	  Yemen	  and	  our	  methodology	  (including	  a	  
discussion	  of	  data,	  its	  limitations,	  hypotheses	  and	  our	  methodological	  approach.	  After	  the	  
analysis	  we	  end	  our	  paper	  with	  some	  preliminary	  conclusions	  and	  discussions.1	  	  
	  
	  
1. Yemen:	  political	  change	  and	  structure	  
With	  the	  unification	  of	  North	  and	  South	  Yemen	  in	  1990,	  the	  Republic	  of	  Yemen	  (RoY)	  inherited	  
several	  political,	  economic	  and	  social	  challenges	  in	  part	  owing	  to	  differences	  between	  the	  
previous	  socialist	  regime	  in	  the	  South	  and	  capitalist	  regime	  in	  the	  North.	  The	  integration	  of	  
political,	  economic	  and	  administrative	  institutions	  strengthened	  these	  challenges	  and	  
negatively	  affected	  the	  development,	  stability	  and	  security	  of	  the	  country	  (Elayah	  2008).	  
Unification	  thus	  brought	  no	  end	  to	  unstable	  political	  affairs	  and	  power	  struggles	  in	  this	  
country	  ‘dominated	  by	  elite	  factions	  manipulating	  shifting	  groups	  of	  clients	  based	  on	  tribal	  or	  
sectarian	  loyalties’(Manea	  2012:	  1).	  
	  
(Violent)	  power	  struggles	  have	  since	  then	  dominated	  the	  political	  landscape	  of	  Yemen.	  This	  is	  
clear	  already	  in	  1994	  when	  the	  South	  declared	  its	  secession	  from	  the	  North	  but	  the	  Southern	  
political	  elite	  were	  then	  defeated	  in	  a	  short	  civil	  war	  led	  by	  the	  former	  ruling	  party	  of	  the	  
North	  (General	  People’s	  Congress	  –	  GPC	  –	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Ali	  Abdullah	  Saleh	  –	  former	  
president	  of	  North	  Yemen	  and	  president	  of	  the	  combined	  Yemen	  since	  unification	  in	  1990)	  in	  
a	  strategic	  partnership	  with	  the	  emerging	  political	  Islam	  party.	  The	  strategic	  partnership	  was	  
broken	  up	  after	  the	  1997	  election	  when	  GPC	  won	  the	  absolute	  majority	  in	  parliament.	  In	  2000,	  
the	  opposition	  parties	  (e.g.,	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  Party,	  Yemeni	  Socialist	  Party,	  Unionist	  
Nasserite	  Party,	  Baath	  Party,	  Union	  of	  Popular	  Forces	  Party),	  which	  had	  been	  holding	  coalition	  
talks	  since	  the	  1997	  election,	  formed	  the	  Joint	  Meeting	  Parties	  (JMP).	  The	  establishment	  of	  
the	  JMP	  was	  a	  direct	  reaction	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  new	  political	  approach	  by	  GPC	  in	  which	  
president	  Saleh	  presented	  his	  son	  as	  his	  successor.	  Although	  Saleh	  and	  his	  ruling	  party	  (again)	  
won	  the	  majority	  in	  the	  parliament	  elections	  held	  in	  2003,	  it	  seemed	  that	  the	  staunch	  support	  
of	  his	  immediate	  clan	  and	  tribal	  allies	  started	  to	  falter	  (Manea	  2012:	  1).	  
	  
The	  2003	  parliamentary	  election	  were	  at	  the	  same	  time	  the	  last	  to	  have	  been	  held	  in	  the	  
country	  up	  to	  now	  (although	  there	  have	  been	  presidential	  elections	  in	  2006	  and	  2012	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  We	  grateful	  acknowledge	  assistance	  by	  Pieter	  van	  Groenestijn	  in	  analysing	  the	  data	  on	  NGO	  placement	  for	  this	  
paper.	  
	  	   3	  
local	  elections	  in	  2006).	  Ever	  since	  then,	  Yemen	  has	  been	  struggling	  with	  one	  power	  struggle	  
after	  another.	  Four	  of	  these	  have	  dominated	  the	  political	  arena	  in	  the	  21st	  century:	  (1)	  the	  
Houthi	  resistance	  movement	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Sadah	  starting	  in	  2004,	  where	  Shia	  Zaydi	  revivalists	  
struggled	  with	  the	  Government	  on	  mainly	  regional	  economic	  issues;	  (2)	  the	  decrease	  of	  power	  
of	  the	  President	  Saleh	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  Joint	  Meeting	  Parties	  (JMP)	  led	  by	  the	  Muslim	  
Brotherhood	  party	  (Islam	  party)	  under	  General	  Ali	  Mohsen	  al-­‐Amar	  (ex-­‐second	  man	  of	  
Yemen);	  (3)	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  Southern	  Movement	  from	  2007	  on,	  a	  populist	  protest	  movement	  
where	  social	  justice	  against	  Northern	  Yemen	  and	  local	  autonomy	  are	  the	  main	  denominators	  
and	  which	  has	  become	  increasingly	  more	  radical	  –	  ultimately	  calling	  for	  secession	  from	  
Northern	  Yemen;	  and	  (4)	  the	  Yemen	  Arab	  Spring	  in	  early	  2011	  as	  an	  emancipatory	  movement	  
articulated	  by	  massive	  demonstrations	  involving	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  pro-­‐democracy	  
protesters,	  youth,	  civil	  society,	  women	  and	  unemployed	  demanding	  equitable	  employment,	  
access	  to	  services,	  greater	  autonomy,	  and	  resolution	  of	  other	  grievances.	  ‘This	  volatile	  mix	  of	  
grievances	  and	  the	  engagement	  not	  only	  of	  youth	  and	  civil	  society–dominated	  protestors	  but	  
also	  of	  other	  key	  power	  brokers	  pushed	  Yemen	  closer	  to	  the	  brink	  of	  becoming	  a	  failed	  state'	  
(Gaston,	  2014:	  2).	  	  
	  
International	  concern	  that	  growing	  instability	  would	  leave	  Yemen	  exposed	  to	  al-­‐Qaeda	  and	  
other	  extremist	  organisations	  resulted	  in	  November	  2011	  in	  a	  Gulf	  Cooperation	  Council	  (GCC)	  
Pact	  signed	  by	  the	  European	  Union,	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  the	  Gulf	  Countries,	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  
United	  States,	  in	  which	  the	  conflicting	  Yemeni	  parties	  were	  persuaded	  to	  enter	  peace	  talks.	  
The	  Pact	  was	  established	  for	  a	  two-­‐year	  period	  of	  political	  transition	  under	  process	  of	  the	  
National	  Dialogue	  Conference	  (NDC).	  However,	  on	  March	  4,	  2015,	  Houthi	  militants	  raided	  the	  
NDC	  Secretariat	  in	  Sana’a,	  therewith	  suspending	  its	  activities.	  This	  act	  of	  violence	  was	  perhaps	  
the	  most	  tangible	  sign	  that	  the	  broad	  national	  dialogue	  failed	  to	  set	  Yemen	  on	  a	  pathway	  out	  
of	  conflict	  and	  nudge	  it	  towards	  a	  citizen	  engagement	  process	  to	  build	  a	  more	  just,	  equitable	  
and	  prosperous	  Yemen.	  Instead,	  Yemen	  has	  currently	  plunged	  back	  into	  full-­‐blown	  civil	  strife.	  
This	  even	  became	  a	  regional	  conflict	  in	  March	  2015,	  when	  Saudi	  Arabia	  (spearheading	  a	  
coalition	  of	  nine	  Arab	  States)	  began	  carrying	  out	  airstrikes	  in	  neighbouring	  Yemen	  in	  order	  to	  
demolish	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Houthi	  movement.	  
	  
Administrative	  structure	  
The	  Republic	  of	  Yemen	  is	  divided	  in	  21	  governorates	  (including	  the	  city	  of	  Sana’a	  which	  has	  a	  
status	  comparable	  to	  a	  governorate).	  These	  governorates	  form	  the	  first	  local-­‐level	  
administrative	  unit.	  Each	  governorate	  is	  in	  turn	  divided	  in	  directorates	  (333	  in	  total)	  
subdivided	  again	  in	  urban	  (cities,	  districts	  and	  neighbourhoods)	  and	  rural	  (sub-­‐directorates,	  
villages	  and	  camps)	  sub-­‐divisions	  (see	  Table	  1	  for	  an	  overview	  of	  governorates	  and	  the	  
number	  of	  directorates	  per	  governorate).	  The	  highest-­‐level	  administrator	  in	  a	  governorate	  is	  
the	  governor	  appointed	  by	  the	  president.	  	  
	  
The	  governorate	  is	  therefore	  an	  administrative,	  not	  a	  political	  unit,	  though	  it	  overlaps	  with	  
several	  sub-­‐governorate	  political	  units	  (i.e.,	  directorates).	  In	  principle,	  each	  directorate	  votes	  
for	  its	  own	  Member	  of	  Parliament	  (MP)	  although	  some	  directorates	  are	  joined	  in	  case	  of	  a	  low	  
population.	  The	  last	  parliamentary	  elections	  were	  held	  in	  2003.	  Next	  to	  these	  parliamentary	  
elections,	  there	  are	  local	  council	  elections	  at	  directorate	  level,	  the	  last	  of	  which	  was	  held	  in	  
2006.	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Table	  1.	   The	  national	  and	  sub-­‐administrative	  division	  in	  Yemen	  	  
	  
Governorates	   #	  Directorates	   Governorates	   #	  Directorates	  
Ibb	   20	   Sa'adah	   15	  
Abyan	   11	   Sana'a	   16	  
Sana'a	  City	   10	   Aden	   8	  
Al-­‐Baida	   20	   Laheg	   15	  
Taiz	   23	   Mareb	   14	  
Al-­‐Jawf	   12	   Al-­‐Mahweet	   9	  
Hajjah	   31	   Al-­‐Maharah	   9	  
Al-­‐Hodeidah	   26	   Amran	   20	  
Hadramout	   30	   Al-­‐Daleh	   9	  
Dhamar	   12	   Reymah	   6	  
Shabwah	   17	   Total	   333	  
	  
Source:	  Yemen	  COS,	  2013	  
	  
	  
2. LNGOs	  and	  INGOs	  in	  Yemen	  	  
As	  part	  of	  its	  strive	  towards	  economic	  and	  political	  reforms	  since	  1998,	  and	  in	  close	  
cooperation	  with	  the	  World	  Bank	  (Elbayar	  2005:	  35),	  the	  Yemeni	  government	  in	  2001	  passed	  
the	  Law	  on	  Associations	  and	  Foundations	  (Law	  1)	  which	  has	  subsequently	  been	  heralded	  as	  
‘the	  most	  enabling	  law	  governing	  civil	  society	  organisations	  (CSOs)	  in	  the	  Arabian	  peninsula’	  
(ICNL	  2015).	  Although	  there	  are	  some	  restrictions	  the	  Law	  in	  general	  provides	  for	  freedom	  of	  
association,	  for	  organisations	  to	  operate	  with	  minimal	  government	  interference	  and	  for	  no	  
legal	  barriers	  to	  receiving	  foreign	  funding	  (although	  such	  funding	  should	  be	  reported).	  
Interestingly,	  the	  ‘NGO	  Law’	  leaves	  it	  up	  to	  the	  associations	  and	  foundations	  (whether	  local	  or	  
international	  ones)	  to	  register	  or	  not.	  Thousands	  of	  such	  organisations	  since	  then	  have	  indeed	  
registered	  but	  thousands	  have	  also	  chosen	  not	  to.	  In	  2014,	  the	  World	  Bank	  stated	  that	  next	  to	  
the	  then	  8,317	  registered	  CSOs	  there	  were	  ‘more	  than	  6,000	  other	  CSOs	  [...]	  estimated	  to	  be	  
operating	  without	  registration’.	  The	  total	  number	  of	  the	  non-­‐governmental	  or	  civil	  society	  
organisations	  in	  Yemen	  is	  said	  to	  have	  reached	  about	  15,000	  in	  2015	  of	  which	  around	  40%	  or	  
more	  are	  not	  officially	  registered	  (World	  Bank	  2014;	  UNDP	  2014).	  
	  
Since	  passing	  Law	  1,	  the	  number	  of	  registered	  local	  NGOs	  (LNGOs)	  has	  increased	  substantially	  
reaching	  nearly	  10,000	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2013.	  Between	  2000	  and	  2013,	  each	  year	  on	  average	  an	  
additional	  531	  CSOs	  registered	  with	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Social	  Affairs	  and	  Labour	  (MoSAL)	  (also	  see	  
Figure	  1	  showing	  the	  increase	  in	  number	  of	  registered	  organisations).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  a	  
total	  of	  105	  International	  NGOs	  (INGO)	  were	  registered	  with	  the	  NGO	  Bureau	  in	  2013.	  
	  
These	  numbers	  already	  show	  that	  civil	  society	  in	  Yemen	  is	  by	  no	  means	  small.	  Whereas	  the	  
World	  Bank	  (2014:	  ix)	  may	  be	  correct	  in	  stating	  that	  NGOs	  ‘in	  Yemen	  are	  among	  the	  most	  
vibrant	  and	  dynamic	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  (MNA)	  region’,	  it	  is	  absolutely	  clear	  
that	  the	  NGO	  sector	  is	  quite	  diverse.	  This	  diversity,	  for	  instance,	  becomes	  clear	  when	  looking	  
at	  the	  types	  of	  NGOs	  distinguished	  by	  the	  Yemeni	  government	  (notwithstanding	  that	  the	  exact	  




	  	   5	  
Figure	  1	  An	  increasing	  number	  of	  local	  CSOs	  registered	  (2000-­‐2013)	  
	  
Source:	  own	  calculations	  based	  on	  the	  data	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Social	  Affairs	  and	  Labour	  (MOSAL) in	  Yemen	  
	  	  
Law	  1	  of	  2001	  principally	  distinguishes	  between	  associations	  and	  foundations	  to	  which	  unions	  
(‘an	  entity	  that	  consists	  of	  Associations	  and/or	  Foundations’	  –	  World	  Bank	  2013:	  45).	  Whereas	  
foundations	  can	  be	  established	  ‘by	  one	  or	  more	  natural	  or	  legal	  person’	  and	  their	  main	  aim	  by	  
definition	  is	  to	  undertake	  ‘a	  public	  benefit	  function’,	  (popular)	  associations	  can	  only	  be	  
established	  ‘by	  natural	  persons	  the	  least	  number	  of	  which	  is	  21	  persons	  at	  the	  time	  of	  
application	  for	  the	  establishment	  and	  41	  persons	  at	  the	  constituent	  meeting’	  (GoY	  2001).	  In	  
contrast	  to	  foundations,	  associations	  can	  also	  have	  a	  ‘common	  benefit	  for	  a	  specific	  social	  
group’.	  The	  same	  rules	  as	  for	  associations	  applies	  to	  unions	  which	  are	  either	  sector-­‐oriented	  
(i.e.,	  unions	  consisting	  of	  associations	  and	  foundations	  having	  ‘the	  same	  typology	  and	  work	  in	  
the	  same	  field	  at	  the	  governorate	  or	  national	  levels’)	  or	  geographically-­‐based	  (i.e.,	  unions	  
consisting	  of	  ‘all	  the	  foundations	  and	  associations	  in	  the	  same	  governorate,	  regardless	  of	  their	  
scope	  of	  work’)	  (World	  Bank	  2013:	  13,	  45).	  
	  
Table	  2	   Total	  number	  of	  organisations	  per	  type	  –	  absolute	  numbers	  and	  in	  %	  total	  
	   (N=9.773)	  (2013)	  
	  
Type	  of	  the	  NGOs	   Abs.	  numbers	   in	  %	  total	  
Charitable	  organisation	   3,255	   33.3%	  
Development	  organisations	   3,125	   32.0%	  
Social	  &	  humanitarian	  institutions	   2,331	   23.9%	  
Cultural	  organisations	   329	   3.4%	  
Professional	  and	  agricultural	  organisations	  	   289	   3.0%	  
Cultural	  and	  media	  forums	  	   149	   1.5%	  
General	  unions	   139	   1.4%	  
Scientific	  organisations	   79	   0.8%	  
Clubs	   35	   0.4%	  
Friendships	  organisations	   29	   0.3%	  
Brotherhood	  organisations	   13	   0.1%	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Although	  this	  sounds	  quite	  clear,	  in	  reality	  a	  large	  number	  of	  different	  types	  of	  associations	  
are	  distinguished	  as	  Table	  2	  clearly	  shows.	  For	  some	  of	  these	  additional	  procedures	  have	  been	  
established.	  Cultural	  organisations	  and	  clubs,	  for	  instance,	  need	  the	  permission	  of	  the	  Ministry	  
of	  Culture	  for	  their	  registration,	  whereas	  media	  forums	  need	  the	  same	  from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  
Media.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  some	  possible	  associations	  (such	  as	  networks)	  are	  not	  able	  to	  
register	  at	  all	  ‘due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  no	  “network”	  classification	  available	  or	  provisions	  
to	  cover	  their	  activity	  in	  the	  current	  NGO	  registration	  law’	  (ibid:	  7).	  Together	  with	  the	  often	  
long	  period	  needed	  to	  register,	  these	  additional	  demands	  and	  exclusions	  undoubtedly	  
contribute	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  large	  numbers	  of	  active	  NGOs	  are	  not	  registered	  at	  all.	  	  
	  
The	  same	  kind	  of	  diversity	  as	  seen	  with	  regard	  to	  types	  of	  NGOs	  is	  clear	  when	  looking	  at	  the	  
sectoral	  focus	  of	  LNGOs.	  Here	  a	  total	  of	  28	  different	  sectors	  are	  distinguished	  with	  the	  largest	  
part	  of	  LNGOs	  not	  restricting	  itself	  to	  one	  sector	  only.	  In	  fact,	  they	  might	  cover	  up	  to	  ten	  
different	  ones.	  Still,	  a	  few	  sectors	  clearly	  stand	  out	  and	  these	  do	  not	  come	  as	  a	  surprise	  as	  
they	  seem	  to	  form	  the	  ‘traditional’	  sectors	  for	  the	  NGO	  community	  worldwide.	  So,	  as	  Table	  3	  
shows,	  gender	  equality	  and	  empowerment	  of	  women	  (60%	  of	  LNGOs	  claim	  to	  be	  working	  in	  
this	  sector),	  education	  (55%),	  poverty	  reduction	  (54%),	  human	  rights	  (49%)	  and	  advocacy	  
(48%)	  are	  the	  most	  important	  ones.	  This	  is	  then	  followed	  by	  sectors	  reflecting	  important	  
themes	  in	  the	  field	  of	  development	  and	  security	  in	  Yemen	  such	  as	  governance	  and	  rule	  of	  law	  
(38%)	  and	  peace	  building	  (34%).	  More	  economic	  sectors	  such	  as	  fisheries	  (2%)	  and	  agriculture	  
(7%)	  attract	  only	  a	  relatively	  small	  part	  of	  LNGOs	  despite	  a	  2,000	  km	  long	  coastline	  and	  an	  
economic	  dependence	  on	  traditional	  agriculture.	  
	  
Table	  3	   LNGOs	  and	  sectors	  (N=	  8,317)	  (2012)	  
	  
Sector	   %	  of	  NGOs	   Sector	   %	  of	  NGOs	  
Gender	  equality/Empowerment	  	   60%	   Environment	  	   19%	  
Education	   55%	   Minorities	   17%	  
Poverty	  Reduction	  	   54%	   Urban	  Areas	  Development	  	   15%	  
Human	  Rights	  	   49%	   Microfinance	  	   15%	  
Advocacy	  	   48%	   Persons	  with	  Disabilities	  	   14%	  
Governance	  and	  Rule	  of	  Law	  	   38%	   Natural	  Resources	  Management	   10%	  
Peace	  Building	  	   34%	   Employment	  &	  Labour	  Issues	   10%	  
Health	  &	  Nutrition	  (Including	  HIV)	   32%	   Agriculture	  and	  food	  security	   7%	  
Entrepreneurship	   23%	   Migration	  	   5%	  
Rural	  Areas	  Development	  	   22%	   Fisheries	  	   2%	  
Emergency	  &	  Crisis	  Prevention	   20%	   	   	  
	  
Source:	  World	  Bank	  2014	  
	  
Although	  not	  entirely	  comparable,	  it	  should	  perhaps	  equally	  not	  be	  surprising	  that	  the	  sectoral	  
focus	  of	  INGOs	  shows	  important	  similarities	  and	  differences	  with	  that	  of	  LNGOs	  (see	  Table	  4).	  
Apart	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  also	  INGOs	  tend	  to	  cover	  large	  numbers	  of	  sectors,	  gender	  equality	  
and	  empowerment	  (42%	  of	  INGOs	  state	  working	  in	  this	  sector)	  is	  again	  in	  the	  top.	  With	  INGOs,	  
however,	  health	  (&	  HIV)	  comes	  first.	  A	  smaller	  percentage	  of	  INGOs	  also	  focuses	  on	  such	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Table	  4	   INGOs	  and	  sectors	  (N=105)	  (2013)	  
	  
Sector	   	  %	  of	  	  
INGOs	  
Sector	   %	  of	  INGOs	  
Health	  &	  HIV	   48%	   Water	  and	  Sanitation	  	   15%	  
Gender	  equality	  /	  Empowerment	   42%	   Capacity	  Building	  	   15%	  
Humanitarian	  Aid	  /	  Crisis	  Prevention	   41%	   Human	  Rights	   15%	  
Rural	  and	  Urban	  Areas	  Development	   34%	   Livelihood	  	   14%	  
Education	  	   28%	   Democratisation	  and	  Governance	  	   14%	  
Save	  Children	  	   24%	   Agriculture	  and	  food	  security	   11%	  
Poverty	  Reduction	   22%	   Construction	   9%	  
Social	  Protraction	  	   20%	   	   	  
	  
Source:	  own	  calculations	  based	  on	  INGO	  data	  from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Social	  Affairs	  and	  Labour	  (MOSAL) in	  Yemen.	  	  
	  
For	  now,	  perhaps	  the	  most	  interesting	  sign	  of	  the	  high	  diversity	  in	  the	  NGO-­‐sector	  in	  Yemen	  
relates	  to	  the	  geographical	  distribution.	  Some	  governorates	  in	  Yemen	  harbour	  substantially	  
more	  NGOs	  than	  others	  and	  have	  also	  seen	  a	  substantially	  bigger	  increase	  over	  the	  years.	  Not	  
surprisingly,	  a	  large	  part	  of	  NGO’s	  (2,354	  or	  24.1%)	  has	  its	  headquarter	  in	  the	  capital	  Sana’a	  
city,	  whereas	  the	  governorates	  of	  Reymah,	  Al-­‐Baida	  and	  Al-­‐Jawf	  each	  only	  covers	  around	  1%	  
of	  registered	  NGOs.	  Table	  5	  and	  Figure	  2provide	  an	  overview	  showing	  how	  many	  LNGOs	  have	  
their	  headquarter	  in	  which	  governorate.	  	  
	  
Table	  5	   LNGOs	  active	  in	  Yemen	  and	  Governorates	  (N=9,773)	  (2013)	  –	  date	  of	  establishment	  
	   /	  registration	  
	  
	   2000	   2001	   2002	   2003	   2004	   2005	   2006	   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	   2013	  
Ibb	   126	   151	   171	   202	   234	   269	   281	   311	   367	   401	   437	   461	   489	   552	  
Abyan	   174	   212	   226	   256	   291	   337	   352	   393	   436	   468	   507	   507	   511	   537	  
Sana'a	  City	   532	   612	   663	   737	   790	   964	   1051	   1234	   1368	   1486	   1716	   1864	   2138	   2354	  
Al-­‐Baida	   38	   49	   56	   61	   65	   71	   73	   81	   85	   90	   93	   93	   93	   99	  
Taiz	   327	   379	   431	   460	   477	   499	   504	   548	   579	   614	   648	   715	   769	   802	  
Al-­‐Jawf	   19	   23	   32	   44	   50	   51	   52	   56	   63	   64	   71	   75	   77	   94	  
Hajjah	   53	   62	   78	   88	   110	   148	   185	   208	   248	   266	   299	   313	   338	   372	  
Al-­‐Hodeidah	   217	   297	   349	   386	   462	   481	   484	   542	   626	   696	   768	   831	   913	   913	  
Hadramout	   208	   238	   260	   291	   320	   351	   357	   412	   445	   478	   525	   569	   626	   715	  
Dhamar	   106	   119	   124	   133	   142	   147	   148	   197	   240	   247	   289	   346	   382	   416	  
Shabwah	   95	   101	   109	   116	   126	   138	   154	   177	   193	   200	   220	   220	   228	   228	  
Sa'adah	   49	   59	   66	   71	   77	   80	   86	   90	   94	   97	   106	   132	   143	   152	  
Sana'a	  	   99	   116	   126	   139	   153	   176	   196	   236	   253	   266	   293	   323	   340	   361	  
Aden	   366	   389	   412	   430	   451	   458	   469	   489	   497	   514	   526	   546	   594	   673	  
Laheg	   171	   200	   220	   238	   259	   280	   305	   315	   337	   347	   351	   362	   376	   393	  
Mareb	   28	   32	   40	   44	   53	   60	   65	   75	   84	   89	   100	   110	   119	   136	  
Al-­‐Mahweet	   42	   55	   64	   78	   95	   109	   115	   126	   126	   130	   136	   143	   147	   147	  
Al-­‐Maharah	   44	   53	   58	   61	   71	   72	   73	   77	   82	   85	   88	   93	   102	   105	  
Amran	   65	   76	   85	   96	   120	   165	   176	   200	   224	   229	   246	   258	   276	   294	  
Al-­‐Daleh	   62	   73	   79	   87	   97	   116	   126	   155	   193	   233	   283	   329	   347	   350	  
Reymah	   38	   41	   43	   46	   47	   51	   52	   55	   56	   58	   63	   67	   74	   80	  
Total	   2859	   3337	   3692	   4160	   4532	   5005	   5128	   5977	   6596	   7058	   7765	   8357	   9082	   9773	  
	  
Source:	  own	  calculations	  based	  on	  INGO	  data	  from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Social	  Affairs	  and	  Labour	  (MOSAL) in	  Yemen.	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Notwithstanding	  that	  a	  World	  Bank	  survey	  of	  2013	  in	  the	  major	  five	  governorates	  found	  that	  
37%	  of	  the	  registered	  LNGOs	  reported	  to	  ‘work	  in	  more	  than	  one	  governorate	  in	  Yemen’	  
(World	  Bank	  2013:	  38),	  lack	  of	  data	  means	  we	  have	  to	  take	  the	  headquarter	  of	  LNGOs	  as	  an	  
indication	  where	  these	  LNGOs	  work.	  In	  effect,	  all	  9.773	  LNGOs	  included	  here	  are	  seen	  as	  being	  
active	  only	  in	  the	  governorate	  in	  which	  they	  are	  registered.	  For	  the	  105	  INGOs	  included	  here	  
more	  detailed	  information	  is	  available	  showing	  that	  many	  are	  active	  in	  more	  than	  one	  
governorate.	  In	  fact,	  54	  of	  them	  (49.5%)	  reportedly	  is	  active	  in	  all	  21	  governorates	  in	  Yemen,	  
whereas	  the	  remaining	  ones	  are	  active	  in	  anything	  between	  one	  and	  six	  governorates.	  Looking	  
at	  individual	  governorates	  shows	  that	  the	  differences	  in	  number	  of	  active	  INGOs	  is	  relatively	  
small.	  Although	  Aden,	  Sana’a	  city,	  Taiz,	  Abyan	  and	  Hadramout	  cover	  the	  largest	  number	  with	  
between	  61	  and	  67	  active	  INGOs,	  the	  governorates	  ranking	  bottom	  (such	  as	  Mareb,	  Shabwah	  
and	  Haijah)	  still	  cover	  54	  INGOs.	  	  
	  
	  
3. Methodology	  	  
For	  our	  analysis	  we	  take	  the	  aggregate	  number	  of	  NGOs	  per	  governorate	  in	  2013	  as	  the	  
dependent	  variable.	  Data	  comes	  from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Social	  Affairs	  and	  Labour	  and	  provides	  
the	  most	  comprehensive	  and	  annually	  updated	  information	  on	  the	  number	  of	  NGOs.	  Still,	  this	  
data	  is	  not	  flawless	  for	  two	  reasons	  already	  mentioned.	  First	  of	  all	  because	  it	  does	  not	  include	  
information	  about	  the	  locations	  (at	  governorate	  level)	  where	  NGOs	  actually	  work.	  Capacity	  
problems	  at	  the	  Ministry	  (and	  its	  local	  offices)	  is	  undoubtedly	  contributing	  to	  this	  flaw	  in	  data	  
although	  NGOs	  have	  been	  removed	  from	  the	  list	  over	  the	  years	  because	  they	  were	  no	  longer	  
active.	  Secondly,	  the	  data	  only	  include	  registered	  NGOs	  thus	  leaving	  out	  a	  large	  number	  of	  
local	  NGOs	  which,	  for	  whatever	  reason,	  did	  not	  officially	  register.	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For	  independent	  variables	  we	  stick	  to	  the	  saintly,	  self-­‐serving	  and	  political	  placement	  
explanations	  developed	  by	  Brass	  (2012).	  In	  determining	  the	  predictors	  for	  each	  of	  these	  
categories,	  we	  follow	  Brass	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  but	  deviate	  where	  constraints	  in	  data	  
availability	  so	  required	  (also	  see	  Box	  1).	  We	  add,	  however,	  the	  number	  of	  INGOs	  per	  
governorate	  as	  an	  explanatory	  ‘convenient’	  factor	  of	  local	  NGO’s	  allocation.	  Table	  6	  then	  
shows	  the	  existing	  explanations	  and	  hypotheses	  for	  our	  analysis,	  while	  Table	  7	  provides	  the	  
descriptive	  statistics	  of	  the	  variables	  included.	  
	  
Box	  1.	  Data	  collection	  
	  
We	  use	  data	  on	  NGO	  placement	  (i.e.,	  the	  division	  of	  local	  NGOs	  per	  governorate)	  for	  the	  year	  2013	  and	  decided	  
to	  collect	  data	  for	  the	  independent	  variables	  using	  as	  two-­‐year	  time-­‐lag	  in	  order	  to	  minimise	  reverse	  causality.	  
Collecting	  such	  data	  on	  important	  social,	  economic	  and	  political	  indicators	  divided	  over	  governorates	  turned	  out	  
to	  be	  quite	  a	  challenge.	  Data	  was	  often	  incomplete	  at	  one	  source	  and	  we	  thus	  had	  to	  rely	  on	  using	  different	  
sources	  for	  the	  same	  indicator.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  using	  different	  data	  sources	  for	  specific	  indicators	  allowed	  
cross-­‐checking.	  In	  some	  cases,	  direct	  contact	  with	  representatives	  of	  ministries	  in	  Yemen	  or	  with	  Yemen	  
embassies	  was	  required	  (and	  received).	  Besides,	  one	  of	  our	  main	  sources	  of	  information	  (the	  website	  of	  the	  
Central	  Statistical	  Organisation	  of	  Yemen)	  was	  suddenly	  ‘suspended’	  in	  mid	  2015.	  Not	  in	  all	  cases	  we	  managed	  to	  
find	  data	  for	  the	  year	  2011	  or	  2012	  and	  had	  to	  rely	  on	  older	  sources.	  This	  was,	  for	  instance,	  the	  case	  with	  data	  
regarding	  poverty	  levels	  (the	  latest	  data	  available	  was	  for	  2006).	  In	  other	  cases,	  data	  of	  an	  earlier	  year	  was	  
understandable	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  parliamentary	  and	  local	  council	  elections.	  As	  the	  latest	  of	  these	  elections	  were	  
held	  in	  2003	  and	  2006	  respectively,	  parliament	  and	  the	  local	  councils	  have	  not	  changed	  since	  then.	  Below	  we	  
provide	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  sources	  for	  the	  dependent	  and	  independent	  variables	  used	  in	  this	  study.	  	  
	  
	   Variable	  (per	  governorate)	   Source(s)	   Year	   	  
	   #	  LNGOs	  	   § Directory	  of	  NGOs	  in	  Yemen	  
§ Civil	  Society	  Forum	  
§ Human	  Rights	  Network	  in	  Yemen	  (personal)	  
2013	   	  
	   Poor	  people	   § Central	  Statistical	  Organisation	   2006	   	  
	   Public	  health	  centres	   § Central	  Statistical	  Organisation	  
§ Ministry	  of	  Health	  
2012	   	  
	   School	  attendance	   § Central	  Statistical	  Organisation	   2006	   	  
	   Access	  to	  Clean	  water	   § Central	  Statistical	  Organisation	   2009	   	  
	   Electricity	  use	  for	  lighting	   § Central	  Statistical	  Organisation	   2009	   	  
	   HIV/Aids	  prevalence	   § Central	  Statistical	  Organisation	  
§ Ministry	  of	  Health	  
2011	   	  
	   Urbanisation	   § Central	  Statistical	  Organisation	   2009	   	  
	   Population	  	   § Central	  Statistical	  Organisation	   2009	   	  
	   Paved	  roads	   § Central	  Statistical	  Organisation	  
§ National	  Organisation	  for	  Information	  
2009	   	  
	   #	  INGOs	   § Directory	  of	  NGOs	  in	  Yemen	  
§ Ministry	  of	  Social	  Affairs	  and	  Labour	  (personal)	  
§ Ministry	  of	  International	  cooperation	  (personal)	  
2012	   	  
	   Members	  of	  Parliament	   § National	  Committee	  for	  Election	  in	  Yemen	  	  	   2003	   	  
	   Members	  of	  Local	  Councils	   § National	  Committee	  for	  Election	  in	  Yemen	  	  	   2006	   	  
	  
The	  ‘saintly’	  category	  essentially	  refers	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  NGOs	  go	  where	  the	  need	  for	  their	  
work	  is	  highest.	  It	  corresponds	  with	  the	  main	  aim	  of	  most	  NGOs	  which	  is	  either	  poverty	  
reduction	  in	  general	  or	  more	  specifically	  alleviating	  need	  in	  specific	  areas	  such	  as	  health	  and	  
education.	  We	  measure	  this	  needs	  category	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  number	  of	  poor	  people	  (as	  %	  of	  
the	  total	  population	  in	  a	  governorate)	  assuming	  that	  higher	  poverty	  prevalence	  attracts	  NGOs	  
to	  work	  in	  the	  area.	  The	  same	  reasoning	  holds	  for	  other	  saintly	  predictors	  –	  which	  are	  
generally	  used	  in	  needs-­‐analyses	  and	  are	  consistent	  with	  a	  multidisciplinary	  understanding	  of	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poverty:	  the	  availability	  of	  (1)	  safe	  drinking	  water	  (%	  of	  the	  population	  having	  access	  to	  piped	  
water),	  (2)	  electricity	  (%	  of	  the	  population	  using	  electricity	  as	  lighting	  fuel),	  (3)	  public	  health	  
facilities	  (number	  of	  people	  per	  public	  health	  facility),	  and	  (4)	  education	  (%	  of	  population	  
between	  the	  age	  of	  6	  and	  17	  years	  attending	  school).	  We	  then	  add	  HIV/Aids	  prevalence	  (%	  of	  
the	  population	  having	  HIV/Aids)	  as	  an	  additional	  needs	  predictor.	  
	  
Table	  6	   Explanations	  and	  hypotheses	  
	  
Theory	   NGOs	  are	  more	  commonly	  located	  ...	   Hypotheses.	  More	  NGOs	  in	  governorates	  with	  ...	  
‘Saintly’	   Where	  recipient	  need	  is	  great	  and	  
alternative	  means	  of	  service	  provision	  are	  
insufficient	  
§ More	  poor	  people	  
§ More	  people	  per	  public	  health	  centre	  
§ Fewer	  people	  attending	  public	  school	  
§ Fewer	  people	  having	  access	  to	  clean	  water	  
§ Fewer	  people	  using	  electricity	  as	  lighting	  fuel	  
§ Higher	  HIV/Aids	  prevalence	  
‘Self-­‐serving’	   Where	  NGO	  workers	  or	  the	  NGO	  as	  an	  
organisation	  have	  convenient	  access	  to	  
goods	  and	  services	  
§ A	  higher	  urbanisation	  rate	  
§ A	  higher	  population	  density	  
§ More	  paved	  roads	  
§ More	  international	  NGOs	  (INGOs)	  
‘Political’	   In	  areas	  that	  powerful	  politicians	  help	  
through	  their	  patronage	  networks	  
§ More	  MPs	  belonging	  to	  the	  ruling	  party	  
§ More	  members	  of	  Local	  Council	  belonging	  to	  
the	  ruling	  party	  
	  
Source:	  adapted	  from	  Brass	  2012:	  389	  
	  
Table	  7	   Descriptive	  statistics	  
	  
Variable	  	   Governorate	  









No	  of	  national	  NGOs	  in	  2013	   21	   80	   2354	   465.38	   499.177	  
%	  Poor	  people	   21	   40.45	   59.85	   49.8766	   6.52445	  
No	  of	  people	  per	  public	  health	  centre	   20	   5121.52	   251500.00	   41286.905	   53196.0317	  
%	  Attending	  school	  	   21	   13	   28	   21.26	   3.822	  
%	  Access	  to	  clean	  water	  	   21	   .1	   98.1	   21.088	   22.0519	  
%	  Using	  electricity	  as	  lighting	  fuel	   21	   1.9	   97.7	   40.921	   23.9543	  
%	  having	  HIV/Aids	  	   21	   .00	   .14	   .0228	   .03057	  
%	  living	  in	  urban	  areas	   21	   .9	   100.0	   25.564	   26.9539	  
Population	  density	  	   21	   1.2	   16055.6	   887.980	   3478.3037	  
Paved	  roads	  density	   20	   .00	   10.13	   .5579	   2.25293	  
No	  of	  international	  NGOs	  in	  2012	   21	   49	   66	   54.52	   5.269	  
MP	  from	  ruling	  party	  (%)	   21	   28.6	   100.0	   62.537	   18.8412	  
Local	  council	  members	  from	  ruling	  party	  (%)	   21	   35.71	   91.44	   72.5502	   16.15129	  
	  
The	  ‘self-­‐serving’	  or	  ‘convenience’	  category	  essentially	  states	  that	  NGOs	  will	  go	  there	  where	  
they	  (and	  their	  workers)	  have	  convenient	  access	  to	  goods	  and	  services	  thus	  making	  their	  work	  
and	  lives	  more	  pleasant	  and	  easier.	  Here	  we	  take	  the	  ease	  of	  reaching	  and	  travelling	  a	  
governorate	  (km	  of	  paved	  roads	  per	  1.000	  km2	  in	  a	  governorate)	  as	  a	  first	  predictor.	  We	  also	  
include	  population	  density	  (number	  of	  people	  per	  km2,	  following	  the	  idea	  that	  being	  able	  to	  
reach	  a	  large	  number	  of	  people	  is	  important	  for	  NGOs)	  and	  the	  urbanisation	  rate	  (%	  of	  
population	  living	  in	  urban	  areas,	  following	  the	  idea	  that	  urban	  areas	  generally	  provide	  more	  
easy	  access	  to	  goods	  and	  services	  than	  do	  rural	  areas)	  as	  independent	  variables	  for	  
	  	   11	  
convenience.	  As	  mentioned	  already,	  we	  include	  the	  presence	  of	  INGOs	  in	  a	  governorate	  as	  an	  
additional	  convenience	  factor	  assuming	  that	  a	  higher	  number	  of	  INGOs	  working	  in	  an	  area	  
makes	  access	  to	  knowledge,	  funding	  and	  cooperation	  opportunities	  easier	  for	  local	  NGOs.	  
	  
Finally,	  and	  following	  the	  idea	  that	  political	  networks	  are	  important	  for	  the	  work	  of	  NGOs,	  we	  
look	  at	  the	  ‘political’	  category.	  Here,	  we	  assume	  that	  governorates	  with	  a	  stronger	  link	  to	  the	  
ruling	  party	  have	  more	  NGOs	  than	  those	  that	  do	  not.	  We	  measure	  this	  strength	  at	  two	  levels	  
(central	  and	  governorate)	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  percentage	  of	  total	  MPs	  or	  Local	  Council	  
members	  belonging	  to	  the	  ruling	  party.	  	  
	  
	  
4. Findings:	  what	  drives	  the	  geographical	  allocation	  of	  local	  NGOs	  in	  Yemen?	  
We	  estimate	  a	  two	  linear	  multiple	  regression	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  which	  factors	  determine	  the	  
geographical	  distribution	  of	  national	  NGOs.	  First,	  however,	  we	  looked	  at	  the	  correlation	  
between	  the	  independent	  variables	  used	  here.	  As	  Appendix	  1	  shows,	  several	  of	  these	  
variables	  are	  highly	  correlated	  –	  within	  and	  between	  the	  three	  categories	  of	  predictors.	  In	  the	  
‘saintly’	  category,	  Poverty	  (S-­‐V1)	  is	  the	  only	  predictor	  that	  is	  not	  correlated	  to	  any	  of	  the	  other	  
variables.	  Schools	  (S-­‐V3)	  and	  Health	  Centres	  (S-­‐V2)	  significantly	  correlate	  and	  we	  decided	  to	  
include	  only	  Health	  Centres	  in	  our	  analysis.	  The	  remaining	  three	  ‘saintly’	  indicators	  are	  all	  left	  
out	  because	  they	  are	  not	  only	  highly	  correlated	  with	  each	  other	  but	  also	  with	  several	  
convenience	  and	  political	  predictors.	  Following	  the	  same	  logic,	  in	  the	  ‘convenience’	  or	  ‘self-­‐
serving’	  category	  only	  INGOs	  (C-­‐V4)	  and	  Population	  density	  (C-­‐V2)	  remain	  as	  predictors.	  Under	  
the	  ‘political’	  category	  MPs	  (P-­‐V1)	  and	  LC	  (Local	  Council	  members)	  (P-­‐V2)	  significantly	  
correlate.	  With	  MPs	  also	  correlating	  with	  INGOs	  we	  only	  included	  Local	  Council	  members	  as	  
predictor	  here.	  
	  
Table	  8.	  Number	  of	  local	  NGOs	  
	  
	   Saintly	   	  
S-­‐V1	   Poverty	   -­‐2.332	  
[6.719]	  
S-­‐V2	   Health	  facility	   .000	  
[.001]	  
	   Self-­‐serving	   	  
C-­‐V2	   Population	  density	   .098***	  
[.014]	  
C-­‐V4	   INGOs	   34.853**	  
[9.567]	  
	   Political	   	  
P-­‐V2	   Local	  council	  members	   3.335	  
[2.907]	  
	   	   	  
	   Constant	   -­‐1616.173	  
	   Observations	   21	  (20)	  
	   R2	   .897	  
	  
Note:	   Table	  depicts	  OLS	  estimates	  with	  standard	  error	  in	  brackets	  where	  *p	  <	  0.1,	  **p	  <	  0.05,	  ***p	  <	  0.01,	  two-­‐
	   tailed	  test.	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The	  remaining	  five	  predictors	  then	  turn	  out	  to	  explain	  89.7%	  of	  the	  variance	  in	  NGO	  
placement	  in	  Yemen	  (R2	  =	  .897).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  outcomes	  of	  our	  regression	  (see	  Table	  
8)	  suggest	  that,	  all	  else	  being	  equal,	  only	  ‘self-­‐serving’	  convenience	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  determining	  
where	  local	  NGOs	  in	  Yemen	  are	  active.	  Put	  differently:	  there	  are	  more	  local	  NGOs	  in	  
governorates	  with	  more	  international	  NGOs	  and	  with	  a	  higher	  population	  density.	  Political	  
and	  needs	  factors	  do	  not	  play	  a	  role	  in	  the	  decision	  of	  local	  NGOs	  where	  to	  work.	  Whereas	  
Brass	  (2012:	  395)	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  her	  findings	  characterised	  Kenyan	  NGOs	  as	  ‘pragmatic	  
saints’,	  we	  have	  to	  characterise	  Yemeni	  NGOs	  as	  ‘pragmatics	  pur	  sang’.	  
	  
Interestingly,	  almost	  all	  variables	  (whether	  significant	  or	  not)	  do	  point	  in	  the	  direction	  
predicted	  in	  Table	  6	  (hypotheses).	  Table	  9	  (in	  a	  more	  substantive	  interpretation	  of	  our	  findings	  
following	  Brass)	  shows	  the	  predicted	  effect	  of	  each	  variable.	  For	  each	  standard	  deviation	  
increase	  in	  population	  density	  we	  thus	  find	  341	  more	  local	  NGOs	  in	  a	  governorate.	  The	  same	  
can	  be	  seen	  with	  regard	  to	  INGOs	  (+184)	  and	  Local	  Council	  members	  belonging	  to	  the	  ruling	  
party	  (+54).	  	  
	  
The	  findings	  for	  INGOs	  are	  in	  accordance	  with	  those	  of	  Habraken	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  for	  Kenya.	  The	  
number	  of	  international	  NGOs	  in	  2012	  significantly	  impacts	  the	  number	  of	  national	  NGOs	  at	  
the	  governorate	  level,	  suggesting	  that	  as	  the	  number	  of	  international	  NGOs	  in	  an	  area	  
increases,	  the	  number	  of	  local	  NGOs	  increases	  as	  well,	  leading	  to	  herding	  behaviour.	  We	  
found	  that	  for	  each	  standard	  deviation	  (5,269	  INGOs)	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  INGOs,	  there	  
will	  be	  an	  additional	  184	  local	  NGOs	  in	  the	  governorate.	  This	  might	  suggest	  that	  local	  NGOs	  
follow	  international	  NGOs	  in	  their	  geographical	  choices	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  funding	  and	  work	  
opportunities.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  we	  could	  adopt	  the	  alternative	  explanation	  that	  INGOs	  follow	  
local	  NGOs	  as	  they	  seek	  local	  partner	  organisations	  to	  carry	  out	  their	  programme	  
implementation.	  	  
	  
The	  exception	  is	  formed	  by	  the	  two	  saintly	  predictors.	  Most	  remarkable	  here	  is	  Poverty.	  As	  
Table	  9	  predicts	  there	  will	  be	  fewer	  local	  NGOs	  in	  a	  governorate	  if	  poverty	  increases	  (i.e.,	  a	  
6.5%	  increase	  in	  poverty	  leads	  to	  15	  fewer	  NGOs	  being	  active	  in	  a	  governorate).	  While	  our	  
theory	  and	  hypotheses	  suggest	  that	  more	  local	  NGOs	  should	  be	  active	  in	  a	  governorate	  with	  a	  
higher	  number	  of	  poor	  people,	  our	  model	  thus	  depicts	  the	  opposite.	  
	  
Table	  9.	  Substantive	  interpretation	  
	  
Variable	   Coefficient	   On	  standard	  
deviation	  in	  the	  
variable	  
Impact	  on	  number	  of	  local	  NGOs	  in	  
a	  governorate	  (rounded	  to	  the	  
nearest	  whole	  number)	  
Poverty	   -­‐2.332	   6.5%	   -­‐15	  
Health	  facility	   .000	   53,196	  people	   0	  
Population	  density	   .098***	   3,478	  people	   +341	  
INGOs	   34.853**	   5.269	  INGOs	   +184	  
Local	  Council	  members	   3.335	   16,15	  LC	  members	   +54	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5. Concluding	  remarks	  and	  discussion	  
Our	  analysis	  provides	  a	  first	  attempt	  to	  understand	  why	  local	  NGOs	  in	  Yemen	  go	  where	  they	  
go.	  In	  doing	  so,	  it	  contributes	  to	  a	  broader	  discussion	  about	  fragmentation	  and	  proliferation	  
by	  including	  local	  NGOs	  and	  by	  looking	  into	  in-­‐country	  placement.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  also	  for	  
the	  NGOs	  themselves	  and	  for	  donors	  it	  is	  important	  to	  increase	  their	  knowledge	  about	  the	  
NGO	  sector	  in	  Yemen	  and	  to	  understand	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  local	  NGOs	  are	  driven	  by	  needs,	  
convenience	  or	  political	  factors.	  
	  
Our	  findings	  clearly	  show	  that	  political	  and	  needs	  factors	  do	  not	  determine	  where	  local	  NGOs	  
in	  Yemen	  work.	  Instead,	  the	  number	  of	  these	  NGOs	  in	  a	  governorate	  depends	  only	  on	  
convenience	  in	  terms	  of	  population	  density	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  International	  NGOs.	  Put	  
differently:	  local	  NGOs	  are	  driven	  primarily	  by	  factors	  through	  which	  they	  have	  convenient	  
access	  to	  a	  large	  number	  of	  people	  and	  to	  (contacts	  and	  probably	  funding	  of)	  INGOs.	  Needs	  
factors	  (e.g.,	  the	  poverty	  situation	  in	  a	  governorate)	  do	  not	  play	  a	  role	  (or	  even	  point	  in	  the	  
opposite	  direction	  as	  expected)	  in	  Yemen	  whereas	  they	  did	  in	  Kenya.	  	  
	  
As	  mentioned	  already,	  our	  findings	  indicate	  that	  local	  NGOs	  in	  Yemen	  are	  ‘pragmatics	  pur	  
sang’.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  should	  be	  acknowledged	  that	  using	  the	  term	  ‘pragmatics’	  is	  in	  fact	  
a	  (negative)	  value	  judgement;	  the	  same	  of	  which	  can	  be	  said	  about	  terms	  such	  as	  
‘convenience’,	  ‘saintly’	  and	  ‘self-­‐serving’.	  One	  might	  also	  look	  at	  the	  fact	  that	  local	  NGOs	  are	  
primarily	  driven	  by	  population	  density	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  international	  NGOs	  differently.	  
What	  if	  these	  local	  NGOs	  use	  the	  presence	  of	  international	  NGOs	  to	  be	  better	  able	  to	  
coordinate	  their	  activities	  and	  thus	  prevent	  duplications?	  Would	  that	  then	  have	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  
‘self-­‐serving’	  or	  as	  actually	  a	  contribution	  to	  more	  effective	  service	  provision?	  And	  what	  if	  the	  
same	  effectiveness-­‐reason	  underlies	  their	  choice	  to	  work	  in	  densely	  populated	  regions?	  	  
	  
Besides,	  our	  analysis	  does	  not	  (and	  cannot	  –	  because	  of	  data	  constraints)	  take	  into	  account	  
the	  type	  of	  work	  of	  the	  different	  local	  NGOs.	  Organisations	  for	  which	  lobby	  and	  advocacy	  are	  
the	  primary	  means	  of	  operation,	  for	  instance,	  have	  everything	  to	  gain	  from	  being	  close	  to	  
centres	  of	  power.	  For	  them	  being	  active	  in	  a	  remote	  area	  thus	  makes	  little	  sense,	  whereas	  
working	  in	  Sana’a	  city	  does.	  	  
	  
Finally,	  one	  might	  wonder	  whether	  in	  the	  specific	  case	  of	  Yemen	  we	  should	  have	  paid	  
attention	  to	  the	  security	  situation	  in	  the	  country.	  It	  might,	  for	  instance,	  be	  hypothesised	  that	  
more	  NGOs	  will	  be	  active	  in	  governorates	  with	  fewer	  security	  problems.	  For	  follow-­‐up	  
research	  on	  NGO	  placement	  in	  Yemen	  it	  would	  be	  worthwhile	  to	  include	  such	  a	  variable	  just	  
as	  it	  would	  be	  valuable	  to	  explore	  changes	  over	  time	  and	  not	  only	  rely	  on	  quantitative	  data	  
but	  also	  on	  interviews	  with	  local	  NGOs	  themselves.	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